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Supporting the “Grand Illusion” of Direct Perception: Implicit
Learning in Eye-Movement Control

Frank H. Durgin
Part of the “Grand Illusion” of complete and direct perception is the transparency
of our eye-movements. We simply don’t notice them. The visual information from
the retina that supports visual consciousness is sampled discontinuously in the brief
fixations that normally occur two or three times per second. Our eyes make abrupt
movements called saccades nearly every second of our waking lives. These eye
“jumps” connect the individual fixations we make, gathering visual information that
underlies our actions and our perceptual experience.
Although often crucial to the successful recovery of visual information in which we
are consciously interested, our eye movements are, by and large, unconscious actions.
They may be said to represent an aspect of the information-gathering control struc
tures postulated by Gibson (1966), though they are not, themselves, part of our
awareness. Given the importance of eye-movements for the retrieval of visual infor
mation from the enviromnent, the question arises whether the eye-movement control
system is capable of implicit learning, or learning without awareness. The present
studies were undertaken to investigate this possibility. Can eye-movement patterns
show learned sensitivity to environmental regularities of which we are not con
sciously aware?
In part, the motivation of these studies derived from evidence that visual con
sciousness often goes beyond the information available to visual cognition. For
example, a visual texture can appear to be seen in clear detail—each element clearly
represented. Yet studies of texture adaptation (e.g., Durgin and Proffitt 1996) indi
cate that our perceptual experience is based on processes of “biological image com
pression.” This means that the amount of information actually available in cognition
is vastly less than would be required to completely specify the detail that seems to us
to be evident in our conscious experience. Similarly, recent interest in short-term
perceptual memory has been fueled by the apparent discrepancy between the amount
of information that seems to be present in consciousness and our insensitivity to fairly
large alterations in the content of our environment from moment to moment (e.g..
Grimes 1996, Rensink et al. 1997). In what ways might the sophisticated control of
eye-movements help to support the “Grand Illusion” of complete perception?
Part of the motivation for this research came from the literatures on implicit
learning (cf. Berry and Dienes 1993, Reber 1993, for reviews). If we are not really
“seeing” all that we think we are seeing, might there nonetheless be (unconscious)
information available to guide the visual-information-acquisition systems? Might not
the whole nature of visual-information acquisition actually involve fairly compli
cated, yet unconscious, smart routines for guiding the control of eye-movements.
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To test this idea, I have developed a paradigm for examining whether eyemovement patterns during a visual search task can be modified in response to hid
den contingencies. Because of the phenomenon of change blindness, it is possible to
surreptitiously introduce a target into a search display mid-trial, during a saccadic
eye movement, so that it appears directly in the line of gaze at the termination of
the saccade. From the participant’s point of view, the target is simply found on the
screen. From the experimenter’s point of view, the introduction of the target can be
made contingent on particular patterns of eye-movement. In a series of preliminary
studies, I found that I could make participants produce larger saccades sooner, if I
surreptitiously made target appearance in a visual search task contingent (probabil
istically) on large eye movements. That is, in time-limited search trials, success rate at
“finding” (eliciting) the target was found to increase over the first 60 trials, and this
was related primarily to a decreasing latency for making a large eye-movement
during a trial. Eye-movement patterns for controls did not change with time.
The goal of the present investigations was to look at somewhat more complex rules
for target elicitation. Specifically, in each of the two experiments to be presented here,
an attempt is made to promote either clockwise or counter-clockwise search patterns
in a dense display. In Experiment 1, the rules for the clockwise and counterclockwise
groups were defined with respect to successive saccade directions. If the change in
direction between two saccades made a turn to the right, the clockwise rule was sat
isfied; if it made a turn to the left, it counted as a counterclockwise. In Experiment 2,
the rules for the clockwise and counterclockwise search groups were defined with
respect to the screen (i.e., on the right side of the screen a downward saccade would
be clockwise, whereas on the left of the screen, an upward saccade would be clock
wise). These rules are schematically illustrated in figure 16.1. Intriguingly, implicit
learning will be demonstrated in Experiment 1, but not in Experiment 2. Conversely,
in Experiment 2 several participants become explicitly aware of a successful search
strategy for finding the target, whereas none did in Experiment 1. These findings
suggest that implicit learning in eye-movement control systems may be limited to
variables associated with the coding of saccades in eye-centered polar coordinates,
rather than in world (or display) coordinates, whereas conscious strategies are best
developed for world- or display-relative coordinate systems.
Experiment 1
The general form both of the experiments to be presented here is that participants
will perform a visual search task in which the “discovery” of a target actually
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Figure 16.1
Rule definitions for experiments 1 and 2. Panels A and B illustrate “clockwise” and “counterclockwise”
saccadic trajectories which could elicit a target in experiment 1. Panels C and D illustrate “clockwise” and
“counterclockwise” saccadic trajectories which could elicit a target in experiment 2. Both kinds of rule were
intended to foster clockwise or counterclockwise search patterns, but implicit learning was only found with
the rules from experiment 1.

depends on first eliciting the target by means of some simple rule concerning the eyemovements of the participants. Preliminary studies had shown improved performance
when the rule involved a contingency on saccade velocity (i.e., distance) during search.
The present experiment was designed to test whether two different rules could be learned
by participants. One rule was intended to promote clockwise search patterns around
the screen, the other was intended to promote counterclockwise search patterns.
If implicit learning of these rules occurs and the learning is specific to the rules,
then two patterns of results ought to emerge. First, task performance should improve
across trials. Second, analysis of saccade patterns ought to demonstrate differential
frequencies of clockwise and counterclockwise saccades for the two rule groups.
Methods

Participants. The participants were 20 Swarthmore undergraduates who were paid
for their participation.
Apparatus. The displays were controlled by a Macintosh PowerPC 7600 and pre
sented on a ViewSonic 17 RGB monitor with a resolution of 1152 x 870 pixels.
Vertical refresh was 75 Hz. The display was viewed from a distance of about 0.5 m
without head restraint. An SRR Eyelink® which uses head-mounted 250 Hz infrared
video and head movement compensation to sample gaze position at 4 ms intervals
monitored eye position. Physical updating of the display could be accomplished
within a single video frame (13.3 ms), for a total lag of less than 18 ms. Gaze accu
racy was normally well within 0.5 degrees, and the display-center gaze position was
recalibrated at the beginning of each trial to avoid systematic drift.
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Design. Each participant performed visual search in 150 trials. Participants were
randomly assigned to either the clockwise rule condition (N = 9) or the counter
clockwise rule condition (N = 11).
Displays. Search displays were composed of 800 randomly scattered, nonover
lapping line segments (approx. 2 x 24 min of arc), appearing, with equal frequency,
in red, green, blue, yellow and in each of 4 orientations (0, 45, 90 135 deg) against a
black background. The target was a red “X” composed of two diagonal lines, (which
was not initially present on experimental trials).
Rule for target elicitation. The implicit rules for target elicitation were intended
to foster either clockwise or counterclockwise search patterns around the screen by
rewarding pairs of saccades that constituted either a right-hand turn or a left-hand
turn, respectively. In essence, any large saccade (reaching a velocity of at least 300
deg/sec over an 8 ms period) was treated as the first leg of a turn and immediately
subsequent saccades were compared in direction with the first leg. Any turn between
45 and 135 deg was considered clockwise, and turns of 225 to 315 deg were consid
ered counterclockwise. Target elicitation was thereafter guaranteed provided that a
candidate target location was available within a deg of final fixation. Since saccadic
movements can be detected and their direction well characterized by triplets of suc
cessive gaze samples (4 ms apart) which show large absolute changes in position,
satisfaction of the direction-change rule could be computed during the second saccade. A target could then be placed near the anticipated landing point of the saccade
provided two further conditions were met. Namely, a target could only appear in a
location previously occupied by one of the red elements on the screen, and, to avoid
detection of the deception, targets could not appear in a location within 2 degrees of
any previous fixation position. If no appropriate location was available, target elic
itation was delayed until some further set of saccades satisfied the rule.
The ostensible task. Participants were told that they were in a study of eyemovements during visual search. This served as a cover story for the use of the headmounted eye tracker. Their task was to find a red “X” on the screen if one was
present and to press a button as soon as they found it. They began each trial fixating
a spot in the center of the screen and pressing a key which triggered the start of the
trial 500 msec later. Trials were always terminated when the response button was
pressed or, if no button was pressed, after 3 seconds.
Assessment of awareness. All participants were interviewed at the conclusion of the
experiment. Several believed that the target was not always present from the begin
ning, but none believed that target appearance was in any way connected with their
search strategy or eye-movements. Only one student mentioned a correlative strategy
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of examining the comers of the display first (though he did not indicate that he had
swept the comers in any particular direction). The results discussed below are
unchanged when this student’s data are dropped from the analysis.
Analysis of learning. Because learning curves are often decelerating functions, the
analysis of learning was conducted over geometrically increasing numbers of trials.
Specifically, the 150 trials were broken into an initial block of ten, subsequent blocks
of twenty and forty trials, and a final block of eighty trials. (Analyses by blocks
composed of equal number of trials came to equivalent conclusions.) The dependent
measure used to assess improvement over time is simply the rate of search success
(number of successful searches divided by the number of trials in each block).
Results and Discussion
In order to assess whether participants improved at the task, a repeated measures
ANOVA of rate of success at the search task as a function of Trial Block (4 blocks)
was conducted with a between-groups factor of Rule Direction (clockwise or counter
clockwise). As anticipated, success rate differed reliably as a function of Trial Block,
F(3,54) = 8.48, p < .001. More specifically, planned comparisons showed that the
mean success rate in the third and fourth blocks (43% and 46%, respectively) reliably
exceeded that in the first block (26%), t(19) = 3.25, p < .01, t(19) = 4.40, p < .01. The
mean success rate in the fourth block also reliably exceeded that in the second block
(35%), t(19) = 2.65, p < .05. There was no reliable difference in success rate between
the two different Rule Direction groups, /"(1,19) < 1. Overall, as shown in figure
16.2a, there is clear evidence of improved performance at the task in this experiment.
To establish that the learning was specific to the hidden contingencies, a second
analysis was conducted to determine whether the two experimental groups differed in
their eye-movement patterns. Because trials were terminated upon target discovery, it
was necessary to perform the statistical tests of saccade-direction frequency only on
the initial portions of trials. A cut-off of 800 msec was chosen, because very few
responses were ever generated before this time had elapsed. Only saccades completed
prior to this time during each trial were considered. The measure used to assess dif
ferential learning of the directional rules was the frequency of clockwise and of
counterclockwise saccades per trial. Because the original intent of the experiment was
to foster screen-relative search patterns, these directions were defined with respect to
the display itself, for purposes of analysis, rather than in the terms used trigger the
targets. All saccades with a peak velocity of at least 300 deg/s were checked. If their
direction at their midpoint was within 45 degrees of being perpendicular to a line
from the center of the display, then they were categorized as either clockwise or
counterclockwise.
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Figure 16.2
Results of experiments 1 and 2. Panel A shows the rate of success as a function of trial block for each
experiment. Panel B depicts directional-saccade frequencies during the fourth block of trials for each
direction and training condition in the two experiments. Error bars in each graph represent standard errors
of the mean.

The frequency of such saccades during the final block of trials was subjected to a
repeated measures ANOVA with Saccade Direction as a within-group factor and
Rule Direction as a between-group factor. Differential learning would be indicated
by an interaction between Rule Direction and Saccade Direction. In fact, as illus
trated in figure 16.2b, this interaction was reliable /’(1,18) = 6.28, p < .05. Overall,
the frequency of rule-consistent saccades was 0.715 per trial, whereas the frequency
of oppositely directed saccades (i.e., rule irrelevant) was only 0.518 per trial.
In conclusion, the results of this experiment demonstrate clear evidence of learned
sensitivity to specific hidden contingencies. Our interviews with participants indicated
that none of them imagined that target appearance was in any way caused by their
actions. Their eye-movement patterns nonetheless indicate a learned sensitivity to the
eye-movement-contingency embedded in the experimental task.
Experiment 2
Saccadic eye-movements are coded in polar coordinates relative to fixation, which
was why the rule in the first experiment was expressed in terms of eye-centered sac-
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cades. However, it is unclear from Experiment 1 whether a display-relative rule could
be learned directly. After all, differential learning was demonstrated when displaybased coordinates were used in the analysis of data. In the present experiment, the
screen-based rule used for analysis in Experiment 1 was used as the target-triggering
rule. Apart from the particulars listed below, the methods were the same as in
Experiment 1.
Methods
Participants.
directions.

Twenty-two students were divided evenly between the two training

Design. Each participant performed visual search in 160 trials. The first 120 trials
adhered to the training rule. The final 40 trials alternated between the training rule
and the untrained rule with the intention that direct within-subject comparisons could
be made for the two different trial types.
Rule for target elicitation. Any large saccade (reaching a velocity of at least 300
deg/sec over an 8 ms period) was evaluated for its screen-relative direction. If the
saccade was within 45 deg of being perpendicular to a ray to the center of the display
when it reached triggering velocity, then it was considered either clockwise or coun
terclockwise (e.g., an upward saccade on the right side of the screen would be con
sidered counterclockwise). The rules of target placement were otherwise identical to
those of the previous experiment.
Assessment of awareness. In addition to questions concerning strategies used, all
participants were asked to guess what the underlying rule was after we revealed that a
rule had been in operation. They were then told that the rule hinged on either clock
wise or counterclockwise eye motions and asked to indicate which direction they had
been trained with. Three participants in the clockwise search conditions described
strategies of sweeping around the screen prior to being informed of the rule. All three
had been in the clockwise rule condition and correctly indicated this. Data from these
students will be left out of the main analysis (Two of them were the two most suc
cessful at the task overall.) When asked to guess what the rule might have been four
more of the participants came up with hypotheses that were correlated with the
actual search rule. Three of these four students chose the correct rule direction. Of the
remaining 15 participants, only 6 chose the correct direction.
Results and Discussion
Because of the modified design, the division of the first 120 training trials into
experimental blocks was modified such that the fourth block contained only 50 trials.
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The other three blocks of ten, twenty and forty trials were defined as before. Sur
prisingly, there was no evidence that students in this experiment improved. The data
from these blocks are shown with the data from Experiment 1 in figure 16.2a. In a
repeated measures ANOVA with Trial Block as a within-group variable and Rule
Direction as a between-group variable, there was no main effect of Trial Block,
F(3,51) < 1. Indeed, when search success on the final forty trials was analyzed with
Trial Rule (new or old rule) as a within-group variable, no reliable difference in per
formance was found, F(l, 17) < 1, n.s. Moreover, analysis of saccades in the final
block of learning trials revealed no evidence of an interaction between Training
Direction and Saccade Direction, F(l, 17) = 1.3, n.s., though there was a nonreliable
trend for all participants to produce more clockwise saccades, F(l, 17) = 3.46,
p = .08.
To confirm that the results of Experiment 2 differed from those of Experiment 1,
data from both experiments were analyzed together in a repeated measures ANOVA
with Rule Type (Eye-centric or Display-based) and Rule Direction as between-group
variables and Trial Block as a within-group variable. As expected, the effect of trial
Block differed reliably as a function of Rule Type, F(3,108) = 3.41, p < .05. The
simplest interpretation of these results is that implicit learning did not occur in
Experiment 2, whereas it clearly did in Experiment 1.
On the other hand, seven of the 22 students in this experiment were able to artic
ulate explicit strategies that were correlated with the actual rule, compared with only
one out of 20 in Experiment 1,
= 7.68, p < .01. Apparently, the rule was not
intrinsically more difficult to learn, though it evidently was not learned by any
implicit mechanisms. Indeed, it is a more easily articulated rule, readily available to
explicit awareness.
General Discussion
It would appear that, in this novel paradigm, eye-movement control systems can
learn a rule which is expressed in terms of eye-centric coordinates more easily than a
rule expressed in terms of display-centered coordinates. Conversely, explicit aware
ness of successful strategies were more likely to occur when the rule was expressed
in display-based coordinates. This dissociation is consistent with the idea that the
implicit learning demonstrated here is localized in levels of the eye-movement control
system that retain locally expressed coordinate structures and are insensitive to scene
layout. The formation of explicit rules, on the other hand, probably occurs at level
where local coordinates have been displaced by world coordinates.
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Previous examples of dissociations between implicit learning and explicit aware
ness include Berry and Broadbent’s (1984) classic sugar production experiment. In
their study with a hidden rule, explicit instruction failed to improve task perfor
mance, though implicit understanding developed in the uninstructed. In that experi
ment, the task is presented as a problem to be solved. An important difference
between the sugar production task and this one is that participants in the visual
search task are unaware that there is even a rule to be learned. From their conscious
perspective the ostensible task is transparent in Experiment 1. Although the training
rules differed for the two experiments, the same display-relative rule was used to in
terpret both sets of eye-movement data. It seems therefore all the more surprising
that the very same dependent measure of the rule can turn up such different results. If
the first rule can be implicitly learned, and the second rule would have been satisfied
more frequently by satisfaction of the first rule, why didn’t the participants in Experi
ment 2 simply develop the same implicit strategy as those in Experiment 1? It is
possible that intervening rule steps needed to be learned, but it is also possible that
the consciously available structure of the task (absence of targets in the middle)
somehow interfered with the implicit learning process.
Several participants in Experiment 2 commented that the target never appeared in
the middle of the display (a consequence of the display-based rule definition). Perhaps
the rotary search strategy they consciously adopted (or which occurred to them even
if they did not implement it successfully) was a response to this salient feature of the
search environment.
These experiments were intended to study implicit learning in eye-movement con
trol systems that might facilitate the acquisition of visual information. Although the
conclusions reached here are tentative, rules based on eye-centered coordinate frames
were more susceptible to implicit learning than were display-centered rules. Further
research is needed to determine whether this finding is an artifactual result of salient
differences between the search tasks, or whether it indeed signals an important limi
tation on implicit learning in eye-movement control systems.
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